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A Priori Mechanical Jurisprudence in
Antitrust
Arihur D. Austin*
I. INTRODUCTION
The persistent concern of the antitrust cognoscenti with
defining policy objectives1 has overshadowed the confusing problem of decisional methodology in the antitrust field. This problem raises important questions concerning the nature of the
relationship between operative "facts" and the authority, stability, and coherence of the Supreme Court's findings regarding
competitive effects and statutory proscriptive norms.
In the typical legal conflict, the facts, 2 once established, are
capable of translation into identifiable effects. The impact of
the transformations resulting from "effects" prompts the evolution and imposition of rules or principles which, by the route
of classification, determine the rights and duties of the adversaries. When A runs a red light at a speed in excess of the legal
limit and strikes B, smashing his legs, facts exist which have
produced an easily discernible effect-an injury to B. It has
been relatively easy to develop rules of law which take account
of the effect of A's negligent actions and which provide B with
what society considers to be an appropriate remedy.
3
Antitrust litigation defies the simplicity of this formula.
It is possible to obtain and put voluminous factual evidence into
the record but identification, much less classification, of resultant
effects can be quite difficult, if not impossible.4 For example, in
* Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
1. For an interesting example of this clash see Bork, Bowman,
Blake, & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue On Policy, 65
CoLum. L.REV. 363 (1965).
2. For broader treatments of problems in fact determination and
rule ascertainment see J.FRAwy, LAw AND THE MoDEr M.ND (1930),
and K.

LLEwELLYN, THE Co1iVmroN LAW TRADITION:

DECIDING APPEALS

(1960).
3. See Bok, The Relativity of Economic Evidence in Merger
Cases-Emerging Decisions Force the Issue, 63 MicH. L. RV. 1355
(1965); Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and The Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 HAZY. L. REv. 226 (1960); Dixon, Antitrust Policy: Some
"Legal" and "Economic" Considerations, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 979 (1967);
Elman, The Need for Certainty and Predictability in the Application
of the Merger Law, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 613 (1965).
4. Seen in an evidentiary context, "competitive effects" are "ulti-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:739

United States v. Von's Grocery Company,5 factual data gave a
thorough picture of the grocery business in the relevant market
area. The facts did not, however, illuminate the impact that the
Von's-Shopping Bag merger had, or would "probably" or "possibly" have, on competition. Mr. Justice Black admitted, but discounted, an inability to determine the market effects of the
merger. 6 Mr. Justice Stewart, in dissent, candidly confessed to
7
an inability to read effects from the record.
Despite the pronounced inability to establish a readable connection between the facts, effects, and legal norms in the antitrust field," there are several ways in which courts can bridge
the gap between "facts" and legal norms. One method is to require proof of primary facts and then mechanically assume the
mate facts." The ultimate fact of competitive effect is the conclusion
drawn from primary or evidentiary facts. Not only is the ultimate fact
of competitive effect extremely difficult to ascertain but, to complicate
the matter further, the standard of law (the proscription of conduct
which "monopolizes," "restrains trade," "may be to substantially lessen
competition," or results in "unfair trade practices") "is one which attaches legal consequences not to primary evidentiary facts but to the
conclusions and inferences drawn from them." Brown, Fact and Law in
Judicial Review, 56 HARv. L. REv. 899, 903 (1943). There is present,
therefore, the problem of separating effects (ultimate facts) from "law."
Viewing the problem from the law side, the question is that of definition; what is the definition of monopoli:ation, lessening of competition,
etc.? Viewed from the fact side, the question is whether primary facts
lead to a conclusion of adverse competitive effect.
5. 384 U.S. 270 (1966). The business facts of the merger between
Von's Grocery and its competitor, Shopping Bag, posed scant problems
of proof. In 1960 their sales together were 7.5% of the total 2.5
billion dollars of retail groceries sold in. the Los Angeles market each
year. Id. at 272.
6. Id. at 278.
7. I cannot agree that the retail. grocery business in Los
Angeles is in an incipient or any other stage of a trend toward
a lessening of competition, or that the effective level of concentration in the industry has increased.
Id. at 286 (dissenting opinion).
8. This difficulty has been summarized by the "Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws" in the following
language:
Antitrust law and economics are both concerned with business facts-with individual company activities and relations
among companies and their effect upon the market freedom
of others and the consuming public. Although these facts are
the same whether viewed from a legal or an economic standpoint, unfortunately their effects often are not susceptible of
direct proof and hence conclusions as to these effects often
must depend upon inferences or conclusions drawn from those
facts which are susceptible of direct proof. Thus, it is often
impossible to show the precise effect which a given course of
conduct may have upon competition.
ATT'Y GEN.NAT'L Commn1. ANTITRUST REP. 315 (1955).
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existence of adverse competitive effects.

Certain forms of con-

duct, such as price fixing and group boycotts, are presumed to
produce anticompetitive consequences within the ambit of the
antitrust laws and are therefore proscribed on a per se basis.
The per se approach is, however, appropriate in only a limited
number of situations. 9
Another way of spanning the gap is to decrease substantially
the burden of proving demonstrable adverse effects. Facts do
not have to demonstrate the present reality of an antitrust violation; only the "probability" of a violation must be shown.
The fact that Standard Oil Company of California 0 had gross
sales of $58,000,000, amounting to 6.7 per cent of a seven-state
market, through the use of exclusive dealing arrangements with
independent service stations, evidenced what Mr. Justice Frankfurter characterized as a "potential clog on competition"" and
2
was enough to justify proscription.'
Reliance on elastic standards of proof like "incipiency" and
"probability" does not eliminate the problem of proving the
imminence of adverse market effects, however. Facts must point
to the probability-notmerely the possibility'3-of the material9. The use of the per se rule has not been without controversy.
See Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 625 (1966); Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law,
50 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1964).
10. Standard Oil Co.v.United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See also
Elman,supra note 9.
11. 337 U.S. at 314. It was in this case that Mr. Justice Jackson expressed doubts as to the Court's ability to deal effectively with
economic issues raised under antitrust laws.
I regard it as unfortunate that the Clayton Act submits such
economic issues to judicial determination. It not only leaves
the law vague as a warning or guide, and determined only
after the event, but the judicial process is not well adapted to
exploration of such industry-wide, and even nation-wide,
questions.
Id. at 286 (dissenting opinion).
12. To be sure, Frankfurter's words mirror a postwar approach to
antitrust which is geared to probabilities instead of certainties. "Congress used the words 'may be substantially to lessen competition ...
to indicate that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties."
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). This view
has become, in operative effect, an express term of Clayton 3 and 7,
which contain a qualifying clause (proscribing conduct the effect of
which "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
Monopoly") that already placed a minimal burden of proof on the plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1958).
13. "The standard (reasonable probability) was thus more stringent than that of 'a mere possibility' on the one hand and more lenient than that of a 'certainty' on the other." United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 285 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
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ization of an anticompetitive effect. In other words, a less
onerous burden of proof has not completely freed the courts
from the problem of bridging the gap between facts and legal
14
norms.
There is evidence that the Supreme Court is currently developing a third means of dealing with the problem. The tenets
of a priori economic theories are being substituted for conclusions as to probable competitive effects. For example, economists have developed certain a priori conclusions about oligopolistic markets. In such a market setting, assumptions have
been made about the nature of intra-industry relationships.
From the existence of an oligopolistic market, the Supreme
Court adopts the theoretical conclusions of the economists as to
market effects. As one commentator notes of antitrust cases,
"... a rule of law is required to be more consistent with economic theory than with past precedent."'15
By the nature of the subject matter, antitrust enforcement
and decision making is to a large extent dependent upon the
work product of the economist. Moreover, the "probability" and
"incipiency" heritage of statutory design and interpretation are
particularly susceptible to theoretical omniscience. However, in
endeavoring to resolve one problem the Supreme Court is simultaneously sowing the seeds of a new and perhaps more perplexing one. A priori theory has an expansive elasticity of its own.
Hence the question arises whether economic theorizing injected
into the center of the facts-effects-rule equation has not only
replaced effect determination but has also absorbed both proof
of facts and decisional rule development. Assuming this to be
true, the next question is whether effective and reasonable antitrust implementation is possible under this approach.
The issues raised by these questions have not gone unnoticed.
"The crux of the matter," complained Professor Handler, "is that
14. It has been suggested that one method by which the problem
of defining "probability" and competitive effects can be avoided is by
gerrymandering the relevant product or geographic markets. In dissenting to the majority's definition of the product market, Justice Harlan
once remarked:
The bizarre result of the Court's approach is that market percentages of a nonexistent market enable the Court to dispense
with "elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior and
probable anti-competitive effects."
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 469-70 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
15. Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton
Acts-From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. RPv. 285, 298
(1967).
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theory is no substitute for proof, and assumption is not the
equivalent of fact."1 6 An executive of a large diversified company was more succinct: "Reliance on ... theory is too far out
of touch with competitive and business reality to produce dependable results."' 7 The problem cuts through the Supreme
Court. In Von's Grocery Justice Stewart lamented that the majority had "substituted bare conjecture"' 8 for statutory standards.
What is the level of credibility of these comments? Has the
Supreme Court adopted the theoretical mechanism as an antitrust decisional methodology? The best means of getting at an
answer, and the method adopted in this article, involves a four
stage inquiry. First, the sources and causative forces behind
the trend to abstractionism must be ascertained. The next step
is to summarize briefly the economic theories presently available
to the courts. Following this, the perspectives and the flow of
rationale of the governmental prosecution agencies, as reflected
in Supreme Court briefs, will be analyzed. Finally, as a prelude
to conclusions, the cases themselves must be examined.
HT.

THE TREND TO ABSTRACTIONISM

A. THE EARLy PERIOD
Early antitrust doctrine was geared to the demonstrable
facts and effects of the marketplace. Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act' 9 specifically incorporated identifiable conduct
which had a history of case law available for explication. In
discussing the law bearing his name, Senator Sherman remarked:
"It does not announce a new principle of law, but applies old and
well-recognized principles of the common law to the complicated
jurisdiction of our State and Federal Government." 20 It did not
take abstract reasoning to demonstrate the anticompetitive consequences resulting from the predatory practices of the giant
trusts. Facts brilliantly illuminated effects. Louis Brandeis
could dogmatically say "that wherever competition has been
suppressed it has been due either to resort to ruthless processes,
16.

Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53 VA.

L. REv. 1667, 1680 (1967).

17. McDaniel, Antitrust and the Status Quo in a Changing Society,
in 1967 N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'x ANTTUST LAW SYmposium 4.

18. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 286 (1966)
(dissenting opinion).
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
20. Quoted in Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law1887-1890, 23 U. Cm. L. REv. 221, 256 (1956).
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or by improper use of inordinate wealth and power."2 1 But as
the frontiers of geographic expansion closed and as firms began
to concentrate on the techniques of internal expansion and on
the processes of more efficient production, the traditions of the
common law lost their force as a frame of reference. The enact-

ment of the Clayton22. and Federal Trade Commission Acts2 3 re-

flected the inability of the Sherman Act to keep pace with the
changing economy.
Despite the decreasing relevance of common law precedent
to the nation's commercial world, courts continued to resolve
cases on the basis of the facts-effects-rules question. To be
sure, before prohibitions were meted out, effects had to be obvious
and drastic. Only mergers which had resulted in abusive conduct were proscribed. Thus, to the :1930 Supreme Court the antimerger clause of the Clayton Act dealt "only with such acquisitions as probably will result in lessening competition to a substantial degree....
,,24 The Court cautioned against inquiry
into those forms of behavior which might, depending upon the
peculiarity of the market environment, have anticompetitive
effects. There was, consequently, no need or desire to resort to
economic theory. In the words of Mr. Justice Sutherland, "[t] he
existence of competition is a fact disclosed by observation rather
,,21
than by the processes of logic ....
This is not to say that the Supreme Court was totally immune
to theoretical impulses. Laissez faire economics, which had been
incorporated into Social Darwinism, was a persuasive force indictating the Court's perspective toward regulation of competition. The business community was t:he beneficiary of a protective
wall, erected through a conservative reading of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, shielding it from the encroachments of social and welfare legislation.26
Two other factors had a bearing on a fundamental and
straightforward approach to the facts-effects-rules equation.

21. L. BRANDEis, TE

CURSE OF BIGNESS 115 (1934).

22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964). The Clayton Act was subsequently
amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964) and by
the Celler-Kevauver Antimerger Act of 1950, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964). The Act was amended by the
Wheeler-Lea Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964) and by the McGuire Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
24. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 298 (1930) (emphasis added).
25.
26.
(1956).

Id. at 299.
S. FINE, LAissEz FAwn

AND TEE GENERAL-WELFARE

STATE 139
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First, merger activity, the prime target of antitrust, decreased
during the period from 1905 to 1935.27 Therefore, there was
not much occurring, at least on the surface, that would attract
the glare of attention. Perhaps more importantly, economic
theory was itself still in the early stages of development. Along
classical lines the thrust of concern was with the impact and the
interrelationships of the pricing of land, labor, capital, and
enterpreneurial activity. 23 Significantly, when the factors of
market activity were viewed in their total effects, it was through
29
the purifying lens of "pure" competition.
The problem created by the adoption of this model was, in
the words of J. K. Galbraith, that "it became not the definition
that described reality but the one that produced ideal results."30
Consequently, there was little incentive to engage in explorations, empirical or theoretical, that went beyond the model. As
a result, the emerging tensions and the shifting structural boundaries of the various markets made small imprint on the economist
or the courts.

B. THm ScENE CHANGES
The events of the 1930's illustrated just how far removed
from reality the above views were. The simplicity of viewing
antitrust in quantitative terms of easily discernible "harmful"
conduct proscription and of fitting policy objectives into "pure"
competition was undermined by the 1929 crash and the following chaos.
The decade spanning the 1930's was the heyday of economic
realism.31 The "facts" of the marketplace made it patent that
27. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 194-98 (1968).
28. J. KUHLmAN & G. SKINNER, THE EcoNoMIc SYSTEM 15 (rev.
ed. 1964).
29. Pure competition is a theoretical model under which the existence of many sellers and buyers, all operating with full knowledge,
all selling an essentially identical product, prevented any one seller
from exerting control over prices. C. HARluss, THE AmEIcAx EcoNoMY
424 (5th ed. 1965).
30. J. GALBRAITH, AMERcIAN CAPITALISM 16 (2d ed. 1956). Galbraith
adds: "The definition of competition was, in effect, accommodated to
the requirements of that model.

Its nexus with the competition of the

real world, which in turn was in a process of change, was no longer
maintained." Id.
31. It is interesting to note that it was during the 1930's that legal
realism replaced the assumed certainty and predictability of mechanical
jurisprudence. One of the best known dissenters of mechanical problem solving is Jerome Frank, who published his controversial LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND in 1930.
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neither perfect competition nor total monopoly existed; the actual organization and functioning of the market was poised
somewhere in that large area between the two poles.3 2 Turning
to this gray middle area, the econoraist soon discerned that new,
or perhaps formerly ignored, facts of import existed. Specifically, the attainment of mass production on a grand scale made
it possible for formerly occupied energies to be channeled into the
development of techniques for effectively marketing the output.
A consumer oriented society was born.
The twists and turns of an economy moving at break-neck
speed towards high consumption are dramatically different from
those centered around endeavors to improve the technology of
industrialization. The variables of competition changed, making
the facts and effects of a consciousness geared to productive
expansion largely irrelevant. Price competition and tactical
changes in levels of output, the fundamental strategies of the
business firm, gave ground to more subtle methods of competition. Contact with the consumer was established through advertising, promotion, and mass distribution techniques. The facts
concerning these techniques yield anything but clear and predictable effects. The market impact; of other techniques that became prevalent as a result of the increased emphasis on marketing and distribution, such as exclusive dealing, reciprocal trading, and tying arrangements, are likewise difficult to calculate.
The emergence of the consumption ethic had additional impact. The Supreme Court, though still welded to the past, was
forced to recognize that a justification for laissez faire economics
no longer existed. The onslaught of New Deal legislation
assured the demise of Social Darwinism. As a result, the standard of scrutiny followed by the courts in antitrust cases became more searching. The doors were now open for the adoption
of new views on antitrust.
Fact-effect-rule analysis was further complicated by the
growth of new lobby and pressure groups. Whereas the historical big business versus government confrontation had culminated in clear-cut areas of interest, the emerging demands of
agriculture, labor, small business and to a lesser degree the consumer, along with the still influential voice of big business,
made it almost impossible for one group to have its total ob32. One of the most important studies appearing during this period was Edward Chamberlin's THE TmORY oF MoNoPoLisTic COmpETIrioN. Chamberlin concluded that most industries combine both monopolistic and competitive impulses.
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jective implemented. Not only did these groups have to contend with each other, but they also had to accommodate their
activities to the struggle between two other combatants-planners and antitrusters. With each pressure group pressing its
claim, it is not surprising that an ambivalence in statutory goals
3
appeared.
C. THE Co mawoARY ScF
The fruition of the movement towards a consumption-directed economy started in the 1930's and, interrupted by the war,
was fully realized in the years following 1945. With the existence
of massive productive capacity and what has been described as
an "Affluent Society,"3 4 the focus of concern shifted to the problems of engendering and assuring consumption.
The facts and effects of the mature postwar consumption
economy are dramatically complex. The trends and moods of
consumer demand cannot be ratified into competitive effects as
easily as, for example, the foreclosure consequences of a horizontal merger. During the era of productive expansion the views
of the economist dominated the scene; now, in getting at the
consumer he must compete with the sociologist, the psychologist, and others. Regardless of the path followed, obtaining
meaningful insights into the consumer, his behavior, and the
precise impact of his conduct on the market, has become difficult. Is the consumer the master of his purchasing choices, or is
he easily manipulated by sophisticated promotional devices?
The answer probably rests somewhere between the two extremes
33. Ambivalence in statutory goals is apparent in the following
areas: Labor, an obvious monopoly, was successful in getting an exemption from antitrust coverage. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964). Clayton
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964). Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
Advertising, a field that was to become a vital force in the consumption economy, was codified into fair trade legislation and placed in
the exempt sector in those instances when it culminated in the establishment of brand names. State fair trading laws are exempt under
the McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
Trademarks, a progeny of advertising and therefore possessing
many of the persuasive properties of brands, are also protected at common law and under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1064
(1964).
The statutory waters were further muddied by the Robinson-Patman Act-"one of the most tortuous legislative pronouncements ever to
go on the statute books." J. DIRuI
& A. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION:
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST PoracY 119 (1954).
34. By J. K. Galbraith in a book of the same title published in
1958.
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-but exactly where, and with what consequences, no one seems
to know.
An important feature of the consumption ethic has been the
evolution of new forms of business relationships. Generally
speaking, the projection of business entity influence, as it impinges on antitrust, has gone through three stages of emphasis.
Each stage represents an adjustment to, and an outgrowth of, the
legal impediments placed on previous methods. The aggrandizing efficacy of the trust and holding company, the original instruments of expansion, was rendered obsolete by the pressures of
the Sherman Act.35 The merger-first horizontal, then vertical
-dominated the scene until the passage of the amended Clayton
7, when diversification patterns appeared. 36 With the increasing appearance of conglomerate mergers, joint ventures, and
franchise arrangements, a third and new stage in the methodology of business expansion has been reached.
The new developments in business relationships have rendered old guidelines to proscription of doubtful vigor. Market
share control-the decisive factor in horizontal and vertical merger analysis-becomes less significant when the conglomerate
is scrutinized "and indeed," one authority suggests, "may completely vanish13 7 as a measuring tool. The joint venture raises
similar problems, as its very existence represents the creation of
a new competitive factor. The question is how the market consequences of an arrangement that "usually adds to actual competition"38 can be meaningfully related to existing antitrust standards. Franchising, a progeny of advertising and mass merchandising,39 poses problems more subtle and unique than those encountered in the typical vertical integration situation. Considerably less binding and permanent than the merger, yet tighter
than the typical producer-distributor relationship, the franchise is essentially a distribution and marketing control device.
There are overtones of price control and territorial restrictions.
The anticompetitive effects of these features are, however, frequently muted by both private and public advantages flowing
35. See, e.g., Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197

(1904).

36. See

TION

J. NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND MARKET COMPETI8-32 (1967).

37. Turner, CongZomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (1965).

38. Backman, Joint Ventures and the Antitrust Laws, 40 N.Y.U.L.

REv. 651, 660 (1965).

39. Jones, The Growth and Importance of Franchisingand the Role
of Law, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 717, 719-20 (1967).
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from the relationship. 40
The emergence of new and complex business relationships,
of unmeasureable consumer impulses, of competing pressure
groups, and other alterations in the social and economic anatomy
of the nation have clearly deposited new stresses on antitrust
interpretation.
Ill. THE AVAILABLE ECONOMIC THEORIES
Policy can be expected to determine the depth of the perimeter of the pursuasive authority that a given theory will exert
on administrative and judicial decision making. The influence
of a theory decreases as the distance between the objectives of
the policy and the conclusions of the theory increase. Thus, it
is important to delineate policy goals with precision. Unfortunately, there are obstacles to arriving at a unified and coherent
statement of antitrust policy. To conclude that the purpose of
antitrust is to provide an environment in which private restrictions on competition are prohibited is to ignore contradictory
statutory commitments. Shielding branded and trademarked
products from competition (fair trade laws) 4' and protecting one
group of market participants from others (Robinson-Patman
Act) 42 obviously does not square with a policy of open competition. Hence, to obtain a consistent sense of direction one must
go to the foundational statutory corpus of antitrust-the Sherman Act, sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, and the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The policy of these laws-the hard core
statutes of antitrust-has been summarized as follows:
The basic premise of the American antitrust laws is that
proper allocation of economic resources, efficiency, high quality,
low prices, and new developments will best be promoted by the
more or less automatic mechanism of competitive markets.
Regulation of economic activity is not to be left in private
hands, even though at times private43regulation might seem to
be consistent with the public interest.
A commitment to public regulation does not contradict the
operation of automatic checks and balances in the marketplace.
It is an acknowledgement that government intervention is necessary to assure the independence of these automatic mechanisms.
The primary question is, under what competitive conditions do
40. Id. at 723-25.
41. State fair trading laws are exempt under the McGuire Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
42. See J. DnILAM &A. KAHN, supra note 33, at 119.
43. Turner, The American Antitrust Laws, 18 MoDERN L. REv. 244
(1955).
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the automatic mechanisms become ineffective? Or, stated in a
more relevant context, at what point would the economist
deem it necessary to invoke the strictures of external controls?
A.

COMPETITIVE GoALs

Confronted with the dynamics of the consumption culture,
the economist departed from the unreal abstractions of perfect
competition. Models were developed that recognized market
imperfections. It was concluded that advertising, immobility,
ignorance, time lags, and many other dissident influences necessitate a competitive model that mirrors a market which is less
than "perfect" but not necessarily monopolistic. 44 Imperfect
competition, monopolistic competiion, 45 workable competition
are current and familiar definitional formulations that endeavor
to describe economic "reality." The projection of each of these
theories is functional; they represent environments that are
thought to be competitively realistic in light of the contemporary
economy. Workable competition--whose basic characteristic is
that "no single seller, or group of sellers acting in concert, has
the power to choose its level of profits" 46 -- is considered by
many to be the antitrust ideal.
Whether it be workable competition, monopolistic competition or another similar term, disagreement abounds as to the
accuracy, the attainability, and the overall merit of each formulation. However, the most intense source of friction among
economists-and now lawyers and courts-is not in conceptualizing competition. Rather, it is fn defining the most effective
means of maintaining the desired level of competiton. What
tests should be employed to determine whether a particular
market has a competitively viable pulse? In the process of debate, several dominant views have surfaced.
1. Behaviorism
To one group of economists known as the "behaviorists,"
competition can best be maintained. through adherence to tests
44. G. HALE. & R. HALE, MAR.ET PowE=: SizE AND SHAPE UND THE
SHERM AN ACT 89-91, 411-39 (1958).
45. For a discussion of the distinction between "imperfect" and
"monopolistic" competition see D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS
AN LAw 91-92 (1959). See also P. SAMUELSON, ECONOmICs 483-96
(7th ed. 1967).
46. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Commn. ANTIUrUST REP. 320 (1955). See also
G. STOCKWG, WoPmnrBLE COMPETION 241.-72 (1966).
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of either conduct or performance. The emphasis is on market
behavior. Conduct of a predatory character directed towards the
elimination of rivals is, regardless of possible accompanying
efficiencies or effects on competition, a symptom of unhealthy
monopoly power. 47 But behaviorists believe in factual verification of conduct. This is because
...
the accusation of "predatory" or "cutthroat" practices often
turns out on examination not to stem from the abuse of sigfrom the uncomfortably
nificant degrees of market power, but
48
active pressures of competition itself.

At the other end of the behavioral spectrum is performance
analysis. Criteria such as industry progressiveness, appropriate
profit rates, and effectively directed capital flows serve to define
desirable competitive levels. 49 It is a test geared to long-run
performance patterns and one that covers an infinite variety of
dimensions, including such vagaries as "social responsibility." 50
Behaviorism incorporates elements that make it unattractive
to some economists. While "bad" conduct is easy to define, its
discovery may necessitate a detailed factual inquiry. More importantly, the existence of harmful conduct does not answer the
question-Why? Conduct is merely symptomatic; it ignores
causes. 51 Performance, likewise symptomatic, presents serious
problems of establishing norms of "good" and "bad" performance.
There is also the difficulty in developing universal performance
52
standards that could be applied to all industries.
2.

Environmentalism
Most of the economist's interest is directed toward those

47. This conception of the problem has necessarily directed
the focus of the inquiry away from the rather impersonal
economic forces of the market, and focused them instead, upon
the treatment accorded to competitors of the alleged monopolist .... In other words, the law has directed its concern to the
opportunities of businessmen to compete for the profits of the
market, rather than to any "right" of the consumer to buy in a
competitive market, at competitive prices.
Mueller, The New Antitrust: A 'Structural' Approach, 12 VxLL. L. REV.
764, 780 (1967).
48. ATT'Y GEN.NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST REP. 328 (1955).
49. J. CLARK, COVPEITION AS A DYNAzIC PROCESS 419-29 (1961);
C. GRIFFIN, AN EcONoMIc APPROACH TO ANTITRUST PROBLEMS xiii (1951);

G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 44, at 170-76. See also Mueller, supra
note 47, at 773-79.
50. G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 44, at 171-72.
51. "[T]he most fundamental shortcoming of a 'conduct' approach
to antitrust is that . . . it focuses on the symptoms, and not on the
underlying disease." Mueller, supra note 47, at 782.
52. J. BAIN, supra note 27, at 404-05.
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factors which are considered to be determinative of market environment. The assumption is that by examining a group of
structural elements, predictions can be made concerning performance and conduct. "Market structure is important," writes
Professor Caves, "because the strucLure determines the behavior
of firms in the industry, and that behavior in turn determines
the quality of the industry's perforraance." 5 It is, in addition, a
view that incorporates the opportunity to utilize preventive remedies; efforts can be made to anticipate and preclude any activity
that might interfere with those structural formations which are
the most conducive to "good" market conduct and performance.
The existence of a single large firm in the monopolistic
sense of the word is no longer typical. Oligopoly concentrations
of various dimensions now domina'e the scene. 54 The environmentalist is therefore primarily committed to developing assumptions about oligopolistic market formations. He has developed a
set of theories that can cope with the new and, for the most part,
opaque, tensions of the oligopolistic marketplace. The basic
assumption is that oligopolists do not behave in the way that
competitors would in an atomistic -market. Instead there exists
a collective consciousness which is manifested in joint or group
profit maximization, 5 resort to non-price competition-particularly product differentiation 5 6-- and intentional erection of
barriers to entry. 57 It is upon this line of reasoning that oligopoly theory can be invoked to justify preclusion of interstructural connections, such as conglomerate mergers and franchise arrangements. New marketing techniques such as the franchise and promotional tactics such as advertising, can be dealt
with on the grounds that product differentiation creates barriers
to entry which either insulate existing oligopolies or create
new ones. The environmentalist has devised an additional
weapon to combat oligopoly-potential competition. As long as
potential competitors are poised at the edge of the market, the
oligopolist will presumably maintain a more competitive posture
than otherwise would be the case. 58

53. R. CAVES, AmERIcAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERoRANCE 17 (2d ed. 1967).
54. Id. at 10-12.
55. Id. at 40-45.
56. See G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 44, at 132 and authorities
collected in n.7.
57. J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1965).
58. Brodley, supra note 15, at 354-57.
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External Controls and Environmentalism

The views espoused by environmentalists are generally compatible with the dictates of antitrust policy. The only possible
point of departure is the strong emphasis that the environmentalist places on instituting anticipatory measures. Governmental controls should, so it is theorized, be invoked early,
regardless of how innocuous the activity may appear, to assure
the existence of an environment in which "the more or less
automatic mechanisms of competitive markets" can flourish.
Acknowledging the difficulty of concretely proving demonstrable
or even probable harmful effects, the economist prefers to rely
on what Professor Macklup labels "preventative intervention"
to assure a competitive market environment.
It is difficult to prove that particular actions, say, certain
mergers ... create oligopoly positions; it is much easier to
prove that such actions may potentially be a factor in the creation of oligopoly positions. Assume that there are fifteen suppliers serving a given market; a merger between two of them
would hardly change the competitive situation substantially, but
three or four such mergers could; hence, to be59on the safe side,
one may prohibit even the first of the mergers.
There is, therefore, a discernible difference separating the
preventive form of control advocated by the environmentalist
from the statutory approach of nipping, in its "incipiency," anticompetitive conduct or of proscribing activity when it will "probably" result in a lessening of competition.

B.

CRIcAL REACTION

As might be expected, the a priori flavor of these assumptions has provoked debate. Critics contend that the environmentalist cannot empirically demonstrate that the theory of
oligopoly reflects reality. 60
The unreal atmosphere which surrounds our current theories of
oligopoly may be ascribed to the fact that the assumptions are
59. Machlup, Oligopoly and the Free Society, 1 ANTITRUST LAw &
ECONOMIc REv. 11, 28 (1967).
60. It has been suggested that the strong contemporary commitment to theory has clouded objectivity in factual inquiry. In an analysis of an FTC study on gasoline marketing, Professor Dixon concluded
that the effort to describe the industry in terms of modelistic oligopoly
was unsupported by the facts-which in fact pointed to different conclusions. He also noted that "theoretical constructions seem to be employed more as a justification for preconceived views than as a means
of reaching an understanding of industry events."

Dixon, The FTC

Report on Gasoline Marketing: A Comment, 13 ANITRUST BULL. 105,
126 (1968).
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too often chosen for their analytical convenience, rather than
for their actual relevance to the real world of today. 61
It is, for example, difficult to verify collective pricing behavior.
A firm's pricing policy, even without taking into account the
ramifications of mutual interdependence, is reflective of a myriad of unidentifiable pressures. Geographical location and managerial perspective are factors that vary from firm to firm.
Differences in costs, demand schedules, the lack of homogeneous
products and uniformity in services, are all obstacles to parallel
action. Interfirm organizationP2 -the existence of circumstances
in which "each firm is conscious of being in very close rivalry
with only a portion of the other firms" 03 -can preclude uniform
price responses. Likewise, the juxtaposition of economically
powerful buyers often forces individualized, competitively re64
sponsive pricing.
Even assuming that the effects of oligopoly are as inevitable
and deleterious as contended, the question still to be answered
is: How can an oligopolistic structure be distinguished from
other structural shapes? The usual method of identification, the
concentration ratio-whereby firms are ranked in order of "size"
and the ratio of an industry is determined by adding up the
percentages of the "top" firms-has serious defects. It is not
clear what concentration percentage is required for mutual behavior to prevail.0 5 It is also unclear whether sales, assets, or
number of employees, or some other measure provides the most
meaningful barometer of size. 66 The impact of foreign trade is
ignored. 67 These criticisms, along with others, 8 make it clear
61. R. TRIFFuN, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND GENERAL EQuIBRIrJM THEORY 78 (1949).
62. Heflebower, Parallelismand Administered Prices, in PERSPECTIVEs ON ANTITRUST POLICY 104 (A. Phillips ed. 1965).
63. Id.
64. For criticism of various oligopoly theory assumptions see J.
CLARK, supra note 49, at 471-77; G. HALE & R. HALE, supra note 44, at
134-37; C. HARuIss, supra note 29, at 443-46; A. KAPLAN, BIG ENTERPRISE
IN A COMPETITIVE SYSTEM 50-53 (rev. ed. 1964).
65. See C. KAYsEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN EcoNoMIc
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 27 (1965).
Bok says: "Unfortunately, as any
economist would concede, there is no ascertainable magic size or number
of firms which divides competition from oligopoly or any other less desirable form of market 'behavior.'" Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act
and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HAv. L. REV. 226, 241-42
(1960).
66. F. MAcKLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY 475-87
(1967).
67. R. CAVES, supra note 53, at 8.
68. Bain notes that "a given aggregate is often chosen as a basis
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that decisive conclusions on identification of oligopoly structure
are difficult and criteria for judgments depend primarily upon
"arbitrary" classifications and "rest in subjective attitudes incapable of precise measurements." 69
Equally elusive are barriers to entry and product differentiation. Barriers to entry refer to the long run ability of firms to
maintain prices "above the average costs of production and distribution .. .without inducing potential entrants to enter the

industry.17 0 Between the "zero pole" of complete ease of entry
to absolute blockaded entry resides a sea of variables. The price
variable, influenced by shades of product differentiation and
other interfirm differences, makes it difficult to measure barrier
heights.7'1 Moreover, when are barriers "low" or "high"?
Would prices of 10 per cent above minimum average costs erect a
"high" barrier?7 2 Another variable is the impact of successive
entrants. Closely connected with this problem is the fact that
the distance from the edge of the market, and the power, of
potential entrants defies uniform or mechanical classification.
Perhaps the most perplexing variable is that of identifying potential entrants. The problem has been described as follows:
The difficulty with the concept is not one of legal theory ...
but the very practical difficulty of identifying particular potential competitors with respect to any given market. The
problem deepens when it is realized that under no rational
economic analysis could some of the most significant recent
market entrants have been identified in advance.73
for measuring concentration simply because it is the one for which the
most adequate statistical data are available." J. BAw, supra note 27, at
81. See also W. FELLNER, MODERN ECONOMIc ANALYsIs 382 (1960).
69. G. HALE &R. HALE, supra note 44, at 136.
70. J. BAn, supra note 27, at 252.
71. Professor Caves says:
Unlike seller concentration, barriers to entry cannot be measured by looking up a few numbers in a government publication. For anything better than a broad impression, we have to
make a close study industry by industry.
R. CAVES, supra note 53, at 28.
72. Calling barriers to entry high because they permit a
mark-up of price more than 10 per cent above costs including
normal profits does not prove that entry is actually or nearly
blockaded. It could be that some of these industries would
permit enormous rates of short-run profit, if the present sellers had no concern about entry. We seldom have any idea,
even an approximate one, what the maximum short-run profit
rate for an industry would be.

Id. at 29 n.8. Another economist concludes that entrenched large firms
may be at a disadvantage in repelling new entrants. "[B ]ig companies
are at times less flexible and imaginative than smaller firms-and very

large firms face governmental scrutiny which may inhibit the use of their
economic power." C. Harriss, THE AImRc x EcoNoImv 130 (5th ed. 1965).
73. Brodley, Oligopoly Power under the Sherman and Clayton Acts
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Much of the literature concerning condition of entry is devoted to the concept of product differentiation. 74 Through the
use of sales promotion efforts, advertising, branding, and other
consumer preference building techniques, a firm can insulate its
products from the competition of existing rivals and simultaneously discourage potential market entrants. Since the reasons
underlying consumer preference are not easily identifiable, subjective judgments play a dominant role in product differentiation
theory. Attacks on advertising are usually grounded in sociological perspective. Advertising is said to be persuasive, built
primarily on a nonrational or emotional basis, through the efforts
of the "ad-man" 75 and hence a waste of resources. Drawing
conclusions about a concept that cuts through the nation's social fabric has been disquieting to the economist. One writer has
commented that ". . . economists qua economic theorists-as distinct from moral philosophers-have nothing to say about the
social disutility of product differentiation. ' 76 Another economist
complained that the problem of analyzing product differentiation
is that one must go beyond economics to questions of human
psychology, aesthetics, and ethics.7 T In short, insights into the
anticompetitive effects of product differentiation are as yet too
78
theoretical to be conclusive.
Finally, it has been charged that the theory of oligopoly is
analytically immobile, a static concept made obsolete by constant
-From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285, 357 (1967).

Handler raises the following questions:
Is the mere fact that a company enters a market by acquisition sufficient to denominate it a potential competitor? If not,
is it sufficient that the acquiring company is engaged in a
diversification program? Need the industries be related? As
a practical matter, how can a defendant effectively negate a
claim that it was present in the wings and that such presence
affected market behavior?
Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53 VA. L. REv.
1667, 1675 n.40 (1967).

74. The most prominent works are J.BAN, supra note 57; E.CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLSTIC COMPETITION (8th ed. 1965).

75. J. BAmn, supra note 27, at 215.
76.

D. DEWEY, MoNoPOLY IN EcoNoxacs Am LAW 98 (1966).

77. R. BRANDEIS, EcoNoImcs: PmNcIEs AND PoLIcY 100 (rev. ed.
1963).
78. Chamberlin acknowledged that:
"The Differentiation of the Product" is by all odds the most
difficult subject of all, and the reason is not far to seek. It
contains, not a technique, but a way of looking at the economic
system; and changing one's economic Weltanschauung is something very different from looking into the economics of the
individual firm or adding new tools to one's kit.

E. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 74, at 204-05.
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changes. Schumpeter argued that it is misleading to draw automatic conclusions from the immediate fact of oligopolistic structure.70 Price maximization and output restrictions that might
prevail at a given instant of time do not take into account the
competition "from the new commodity, the new technology, the
new source of supply, [and] the new type of organization" 8 0forms of competition which to Schumpeter affected the existence
or the very life of the firm, and ultimately the industry. The
problem is not how capitalism administers existing structures
but rather how it creates and destroys them.8 1 Schumpeter's
thesis is that this destructive process, springing from the awesome inevitability of innovation, rendered structural anticompetitive consequences temporary. Technological innovation plays
a strong role in a recent attack mounted by Professor Galbraith
against conventional notions of oligopoly.8 2 He argues that it
is meaningless to speak of instituting controls over oligopoly in
the face of the fait accompli of concentration. 83 Responding to
the imperatives of technology, the New Industrial State now
shapes its own environment. The net effect is that the concentrates of planning have virtually eliminated the influence of
traditional competitive forces. 4 To Galbraith, the real problem is how to achieve the most meaningful distribution, in terms
of public welfare, of the fruits of the New Industrial State.8 5

IV. GOVERNMVIENT RESPONSE TO
A PRIORI ABSTRACT REASONING
How have the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission-the governmental agencies permanently concerned
with the problems of connecting anticompetitive effects to stat79. J.
ed. 1962).

SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIAT sm AND DE-iocRAcY 84

(3d

80. Id.
81. Id.

82. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE passim (1967).
83. To Professor Galbraith, there is a basic contradiction in condemning oligopoly effects on one hand and then praising the efficiency

and productivity of the economic system. Id. at 183.
84. Including consumer sovereignty. Thus Galbraith takes the
position that persuasive product differentiation is an effective instrumentality of the "New Industrial State." Id. at 211-18.
85. Another dissent is predicated on the concept of "managerial
enterprise"-the continuity of operation, keyed on the creation of constant demand, and which, despite monopolistic attributes, results in
public benefits. For a discussion of this view and other dissents, see
W. BALDwIN, ANTITRUST AND THE CHANGING CORPOATION 164-74 (1961).
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utory standards-responded to the increasing complexity of the
market place and to the economist's a priori abstract reasoning?
The most declaratory method of answering this question is
through a survey of the briefs submitted by these two agencies
to the Supreme Court. Unlike advisory opinions, speeches, and
"policy" pronouncements, 6 the brief, responsive as it is to the
adversarial delineation of specific issues, manifests a finality of
perspective and commitment to specific lines of argumentation.
This is not to suggest that the conclusions advanced in the briefs
are static; indeed an important dividend of such a survey is the
opportunity to trace the manner in which the government has
adjusted its prosecution approach to new problem situations.
Moreover, because of a perpetual responsibility to enforce the
trade regulation laws, it is inevitable that the two agencies have
evolved, in the briefs, a form of Weltanschauung towards the
interplay of economic theory, competition, and antitrust proscription. Finally, there is a pragmatic reason for surveying the
briefs: the continuous and repetitious exposure of these two
arms of the government before the Supreme Court constitutes
a built-in conditioning effect which, however subtle, cannot be
87
discounted.
A.

ANTICIPATORY PREVENTION EMERGES

The first case to reach the Supreme Court under amended
Clayton 7-Brown Shoe Company v. United States8 8-- is the most
appropriate point at which to begin the survey. Terms such as
"reasonable probability" and "incipiency," which dominated the
legislative dialogue preceeding the enactment of the amendment,8 9 received their initial construction by the Government in
the Brown Shoe brief. This brief is, in essence, an early position
paper on the problem of relating the anticipatory thrust of "incipiency" to discernible indicia of reduced competition. "The
86. See Jacobs, Merger Clearance Problems, 2 ANTITRUST BULL. 187
(1956); Comment, Trade Rules and Trade Conferences: The F.T.C. and
Business Attack Deceptive Practices, Unfair Competition, and Antitrust
Violations, 62 YALE L.J. 912 (1953).
87. A necessary assumption is that the oral arguments emphasized
the main points of the briefs. The respective influences of oral arguments and briefs on the appellate process is open to debate. See Harlan, What Part Does the Oral Argument Play in the Conduct of an
Appeal? 41 CoRNELI, L. REv. 6 (1955).
88. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
89. For the legislative history of the amended Clayton 7 see D.
MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 221-53 (1959); Bok, supra note
65, at 233-38.
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essential issue in this case," the Government suggested, "is thus a
simple but significant one: at what stage in a developing process of industrial concentration.
does Section 7 of the Clayton
Act step in to call a halt?" 90
In 1961 the Government argued that this question could best
be answered by quantitative inquiry. Empirically oriented
standards defining "reasonable probability" and "incipiency"
were recommended. Does the acquisition eliminate "a substantial competitive factor in a significant market?" '
Is the
consequence of the merger an accretion "of power jeopardizing
the capacity of the smaller companies in the market to compete?"9' 2 Another standard considered to be relevant was the
acquisition record of the alleged violator and the history of the
industry in general. Under the "small bite theory," a history of
acquisitions or an obvious trend toward concentration constitutes
strong evidence that the consequences of the immediate merger
would be anticompetitive.9 3
Thus, in 1961, to anticipate and prevent meant to take statistical measurement of foreclosure, to delineate the relevant geographic and product markets, and to scrutinize past conduct.
True, the Government avoided refined factual analysis of the
economics of the market-Congress "made clear its intent to
avoid the necessity for any such analysis." 94 It is also true,
however, that a priori economic theory was similarly avoided.
Effort was made to support conclusions as to probable effects with
quantitative data. Tests and standards were connected with prior
decisions in the tradition of stare decisis methodology. 5 Oligopoly was mentioned not in terms of its assumed theoretical
implications but as one of the possible detrimental results of
concentration.
The argument proceeded from a point of refer90. Brief for Appellee at 84, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294 (1962).
91. Id. at 97.
92. Id. at 97, citing Bok, supra note 65, and Stigler, Mergers and
Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176 (1955).
93. Brief for Appellee at 88-89, 118, Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
94. Id. at 131.
95. The Court cited four lower court cases: United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); American Crystal
Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), affd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus

Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), affd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953);
Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 1961 Trade Cas. 78, 142 (9th Cir. (1961).

96.

The closest the Government came to theory was in the final
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Perfect competition had

B. ANTICIPATORY PREVENTION: INCREASING NEED FOR A PRIoRI
THEORY

In 1964 the Government filed briefs condemning two forms
of conduct that did not fit into Brown Shoe's quantitative formula9 7 In United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Company"S a
joint venture was attacked, and in United States v. Continental
Can Company99 the Government challenged an interindustry
merger between manufacturers of glass and metal containers.
Significant extensions in the doctrine of anticipatory prevention
were made in both briefs.
A joint venture, as a new market entrant, would presumably inject additional competitive pressures into a market.10 0 If,
on the other hand, both members of the joint venture entered
the market separately, competition would be enhanced by the
activities of two new competitors rather than the single joint
venture. Another possibility is that one of the firms might have
entered while the other remained at the edge of the market as a
potential competitor. The readiness of a potential competitor,
the Government pointed out, "to enter the market whenever the
existing manufacturers charge excessive prices, limit production,
or fail to exploit ... opportunities . . .can act as a spur to insure the competitive vigor of those already in the market."'' °
Confronted with a situation in which market shares, foreparagraph:
In short, this is the case .. .to call a halt to a trend that
is otherwise certain to convert the shoe industry into one of
those oligopolistic industries in which a few large concerns
exercise decisive control over the market structure and the
smaller companies that are able to survive continue on sufferance only so long as they follow the leaders.
Brief for Appellee at 138-39, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962).

97. The PhiladelphiaNatl Bank brief, filed in 1962 and involving
a horizontal merger, was quantitatively oriented. The Government
drew heavily from case precedent, building its case around three points:
(1) a substantial foreclosure of competition, (2) a trend towards concentration, (3) the criteria laid down in the Brown Shoe decision. Brief for
Appellant, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
98.

99.
100.
101.
Co., 378

378 U.S. 158 (1964).

378 U.S. 441 (1964).
See note 38 supra, and accompanying text.
Brief for Appellant at 25, United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical
U.S. 158 (1964).
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closure and the other traditional standards for ascertaining effects were unavailable, the Government invoked the doctrine of
potential competition. As a practical matter, the impact that
potential competition can exert on a market is extremely difficult
to calculate. The Government admitted that "it is... impossible
to demonstrate the precise effects upon prices and production of
the elimination of either Pennsalt or Olin as a potential competitor .... ,,102 It is, nevertheless, possible to posit theoretical
effects. The Government's brief proceeded to this end via a
three stage argument.
The first stage provided the theoretical foundation: the
three firm market under consideration was oligopolistic. Secondly, the effects of oligopoly are, under a priori theory, automatically incompatible with competition. According to the Government's summary of the theory, there is "little incentive for
sellers to compete in price or innovation for each firm can anticipate that its efforts will quickly be met by offsetting action of its
rivals. . . ."103 Theoretical symmetry was maintained by the
concluding contention that potential competition would prevent
the existence of such a condition and serve as a spur to product
04
innovation.
Accompanying the increasing reliance on theory was a shift
in goals. Perfect competition was discarded, to be replaced by
workable competition. And workable competition "depends entirely upon... readily available"' 0 5 potential competition.
The Continental Can form of interindustry merger-metal
container manufacturer with a glass container producer-also
presented formidable problems in competitive effect determination. Statistical data on the percentages of market control
exercised by the merging firms in their respective industries
would shed little light on the ultimate competitive consequences
of the merger. Moreover, it is meaningless to construct a relevant product market designed to encompass the "competing"
products of the two firms. The volume and intensity of competition that each company's product attracts from direct competitors in their respective product lines dilutes the accuracy
and relevance of such a determination.'06
102. Id. at 51.
103. Id. at 49.
104. Id. at 52-53.
105. Id. at 49.
106. The Government advanced two additional reasons for discarding the market share test for illegality:
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The Government's solution was a test that was manifest in
its environmental heritage. The lessening of competition standard is satisfied when: (1) substantial interindustry competition
exists, (2) there is a high degree of concentration in either industry, and (3) both firms occupy dominant positions in their
industries. 10 7 The test focuses on the existence of oligopoly.
One need only demonstrate oligopoly plus cross-elasticity of demand-which is itself a theoretical concept 0 --- and leave the rest
to theory. The rationale for this position, expressed in language
of possibilities, ran as follows:
The appearance of a substantial interindustry competitor on
this scene introduces a new firm, with resources and staying
power probably unavailable inside the industry, and without
the history of mutual accommodation that may characterize
those presently in the industry. Acquisition of such a firm by
one of the industry leaders may be motivated by the latter's
desire to protect itself against competition of substitute products,
and would have precisely such an insulating effect. Consequently, it is of concern to the antitrust laws, because such
mergers may well help to preserve and extend the unsatisfactory market structure of the concentrated industry.109

C.

STRUCTURAL RELIEF

AND

EcoNo1m:c PROPHECY

The sweeping elasticity of the environmentalist approach
was made clear in the Federal Trade Commission v. Consolidated
Foods Corporation"o brief. It has been noted that effect measurement or prognosis can be dispensed with under theoretical
environmentalism. It is also true that under this approach,
conduct that is inaccessible and difficult, if not impossible, to
prove can be successfully attacked. For example, the GovernSecond, the particular merging firms may not presently compete
inter sese in all the particular submarkets which would probably be affected by their merger. Since the merger forecloses
the potential interindustry competitor's entry into submarkets
in which the acquiring firm is active, its anticompetitive impact
cannot be evaluated simply by adding present market shares.
Third, the larger the merging firms are the more likely is it
that they produce a diversity of products with a multiplicity of end uses. It would be most unrealistic to appraise the
impact of a merger between the country's largest industrial
companies ...
by focusing only on one or several specific
product lines and attaching conclusive effect to the percentage
totals in such lines....
Brief for Appellant at 23-24, United States v. Continental Can Co.,
378 U.S. 441 (1964).
107. Id. at 22.
108. C. HARnuss, THE AMERICAN EcoNoMnz 380-84 (5th ed. 1965).
109. Brief for Appellant at 20-21, United States v. Continental Can
Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) (emphasis added).

110.

380 U.S. 592 (1965).

ANTITRUST

1969]

ment argued in Consolidated Foods that given the reality of
certain structural alterations, it should be unnecessary to prove
the actual existence of the condemned conduct-accommodative
reciprocity. The problem in proving accommodative reciprocity
is that it results from a unilateral decision."' A company may
order supplies from a large potential customer in hopes of getting
return business. Or, it might be fearful that a present large
customer will withdraw its business if reciprocal purchases are
not made. Instead of focusing on the complex problems of proving specific instances of reciprocal trading, the Government
pressed for an environmental preventative theory:
If a merger changes the structure of an industry in such a
manner as to have the probability of increasing substantially
the volume of reciprocal buying or enhancing the opportunities
for such reciprocity, it obviously has the required anticompetitive effect. To preserve competition, it is essential to pre-

vent any merger which creates such a market environment.
•112

If the use of theory can be justified because of difficulties in
measuring and predicting competitive effects and because of obstacles in proving certain forms of conduct, there is no reason
why the same technique cannot be extended to primary fact
elicitation. By characterizing facts as elusive in source and as
nebulous in content, the foundation is laid for what might be
labeled a priori fact elicitation. This was precisely the form of
argument advanced in United States v. Pabst Brewing Company13--a horizontal merger case.
It has been traditional in horizontal mergers to evaluate the
impact of the acquisitions on the basis of two guidelines: (1)
the existence of a geographical locus of competition and a relevant product market, and (2) the control exercised by the two
firms in this locus as reflected in sales percentage figures (market shares). It was the Government's contention in the Pabst
case that the facts composing these guidelines are, for practical
purposes, devoid of meaningful content. They do not indicate
whether or not the merging firms are selling exclusively to dif111. Reciprocal purchasing by firms may be simply the result
of tacit "mutual-dependence-recognized" behavior. It is possible, however, that if the buyer is both large in general and
is a large purchaser of the particular products of another
(especially a smaller) firm, the latter may feel "compelled" to
purchase, if at all possible, from the large customer.
J.NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND MARKET COMPETITION 112 (1967).

112. Brief for Petitioner at 25, FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,

380 U.S. 592 (1965).
113. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
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ferent buyers in different parts of a single market. Or, assuming
direct competition between the merging firms, the market
might be so accessible to firms of geographical distance so as
to make sales figures worthless in. evaluating power." 4 The
opaqueness of facts in this situation, so the Government contended, necessitates the use of shorthand abstracted standards.
It argued that to define the relevant geographical market satisfactorily, the plaintiff need only show that both firms made "substantial sales"" 5 in a given area and that "there is reason to
believe that sellers whose sales were not included in the market
suffer from some disadvantage in competing with those whose
sales were included.""06
The second standard expressly incorporates what Professor
Bain calls the "fairly complex""T theory of condition of entry.
It is also a test that makes reliance on factual inquiry unnecessary. Moreover, under the Government's formula, it is not necessary to prove conclusively the existence of barriers to other
sellers, nor to demonstrate the height of the barriers." 8 The
plaintiff's burden is simply to prove that sellers within a given
area "enjoy some leeway to price without regard""19 to outside
competition. In this case the Government argued that some leeway to price existed because of product differentiation. Advertising and promotion had been utilized by the defendant so as
to erect a shield around Wisconsin-brewed beer-resulting in a
geographic market that followed state boundaries.120
The doctrine of product differentiation is a prosecution
weapon of immense range. Under the Government's formula in
114. Brief for Appellant at 15, United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
384 U.S. 546 (1966).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 16.
117.

J. BpaN, INDUSTMIAL

ORGANIATIOir

252 (1968).

118. Brief for Appellant at 34, United States v. Pabst Brewing Co.,
384 U.S. 546 (1966). The Government explained that:
Such a burden could not be met without a prohibitively timeconsuming and complex inquiry into the particular costs and
competitive capabilities of all the members of an industry and
would ill accord with the statute's emphasis on "probabilities,
not certainties."
119. Id.
120. The Government contended that four factors supported the conclusion that barriers to entry had been erected around Wisconsin: (1)
not all members of the beer industry sold in Wisconsin at the time of
the merger; (2) the identity of those selling in Wisconsin remained constant over the length of the court record-seven years; (3) the pattern of
marketing in the beer industry is primarily regional; (4) different prices
were charged in different regions for the same brand of beer. Id. at
36-38.
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Pabst, the burden of proving primary facts is slight. A price
disparity between "similar" products, along with a discernible
commitment to advertising and promotion, raises a presumption
of differentiation. However, the most significant advantage of
product differentiation is that it exists in almost every commercial environment. There are few industries that do not contain obvious manifestations of product differentiation.
The Government has found this doctrine to be a particularly
effective means of getting at conglomerate mergers. The argument advanced inFederal Trade Commission v. Procter & Gamble Company121 was that the advertising capacity of the acquiring firm would be channeled through the acquired firm to raise
internal and external market barriers to entry. The difficulty
of new entry was increased
[b]y conferring on Clorox substantial new competitive advantages in the area that matters most in the bleach industry"preselling" the consumer, by heavy advertising and sales promotions, on the real or2 supposed virtues of the manufacturer's particular brand.12

Product differentiation was but part of a wider theoretical
scheme advanced by the Government in the Procter case, however. Indeed, the brief reads like a primer in theoretical environmentalism. The usual structure a priori assumptions of
oligopoly 123 were cited as the justification for the preservation
of potential competition. Other than pointing out the high concentration ratios of the liquid bleach industry,'2 4 the Government supplied little factual evidence to support its a priori conclusions. The assumptions on the presence and effects of potential competition were particularly speculative, as the following
quote illustrates:
The present case may indeed be a classic instance of the
efficacy of potential competition. Procter was clearly interested
in entering the bleach industry, but Clorox apparently refrained from making conditions in the industry attractive
enough to induce Procter to take the step; evidently, Clorox's
price was low enough to discourage entry by a firm, like Procter, which undoubtedly has a high target rate of return. This
important restraint has been removed by the merger. Other
prospective entrants doubtless remain; but, surely, not many
121. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).

122. Brief for FTC at 26, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S.
568 (1967).
123. "[A]ctual competition ceases to be a vital force; by mutual
consent, it is abandoned infavor of parallel behavior and the 'easylife.'"
Id. at 31.
124. Two firms accounted for 65% of sales; six firms controlled 80%
of sales. Id. at 35.
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that would be likely to challenge a firm as well entrenched as
Clorox; and none so likely as Procter. Moreover, other large
multi-product manufacturers, who might well have entered if
the principal competitor was Clorox, probably have much less
enthusiasm for the industry now that they must pit their competitive efforts against a firm with :Procter's market power and
25
advantages.1
It has been noted that one of the most formidable problems
in utilizing modelistic oligopoly theory is classification. 12 What
is the structural composition, in terms of number of firms and
firm size that will, in a given industry, produce oligopolistic
effects? What formula determines the existence of an oligopolistic market? How are the boundary lines between "loose,"
"mild" and "tight" oligopoly ascertained? The Government's
method of handling this problem, promulgated in United States
v. Von's Grocery Company,' 27 is to stretch the boundaries of proscription to the point of "tendencies" and "prophecy," thereby
making classification unnecessary. Predicting the effects of a
horizontal merger "calls more for an economic prophecy than
for a conventional legal judgment."' 28
The test is one of
"evidence of oligopolistic tendencies."' 29 It is, in practical effect, a standard totally divorced from the rigors of concentration
classification and indeed competitive effect measurement in the
barest form. The rationale for such a view is to be found in the
following comment from the Government's brief in Von's Grocery:
It is no answer to say that a merger need not be forbidden
unless it actually creates oligopoly. For there is no magic point
at which oligopoly springs full-blown into existence. Between
the highly fragmented and the tightly concentrated market
structure there is a middle area, one broad part of which is
certainly a danger zone. No one can say-at least not without
an inquiry far broader and deeper than practical law enforcement permits-at precisely what point a particular market will
exhibit oligopolistic behavior. It is thus meaningless to speak
of allowing firms to merge up to the lower limit of oligopoly;
practically speaking, that limit is unascertainable. 130
D.

SUMMARY

The briefs are a clear chronicle of the adoption by the Justice
Department and the FTC of theoretical environmentalism. The
125. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
126. See notes 65-69 supra, and accompanying text.
127. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
128. Brief for Appellant at 23, United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,
384 U.S. 270 (1966).
129. Id. at 25.
130. Id. at 27-28.
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functional and particularistic standard of the Brown Shoe brief
has been replaced with the a priori mechanism. Proof of probable effects on competition is no longer seriously attempted. Instead the emphasis is on the universal abstractions of oligopoly,
barriers to entry, potential competition, and product differentiation. Moreover, the use of theory is not restricted to the inscrutables of antitrust such as conglomerates and reciprocitywitness the call to "economic prophecy" sounded in the Von's
Grocery brief, where the argument was directed toward a horizontal merger. Each brief now contains the prefatory ritual of a
description of the theoretical anticompetitive consequences of
oligopolistic market structures.
A shift in vocabulary has accompanied this trend. The
Government apparently felt that the term "concentration," employed in the original standard to profile an unhealthy competitive environment, lacked sufficient descriptive connotation.
Its proscriptive semantical punch is weak; "concentration" evokes
no automatic and clearly definable a priori assumptions as to market effects. There is, therefore, no advantage in relating the
complained of activity to "concentration" since the task of
identifying adverse effects would still remain. By shifting to
oligopoly orientation and utilizing the mechanical conclusions
associated with this term, the Government avoids this problem.
Parenthetically, it might be noted that theoretical environmentalism has been expressly adopted by the Justice Department
as a point of reference for attacking mergers under Clayton 7.131
In essence, the merger guidelines reflect an effort to codify the
theoretical conclusions of the doctrines of oligopoly, condition of
entry, potential competition, and product differentiation. The
parallel between the argumentation of the briefs and the directives of the guidelines is close. For example, conglomeration
that eliminates potential competition (the Procter & Gamble
argument), that creates a danger of reciprocity (Consolidated
Foods), or tends to raise barriers to entry (again Procter & Gamble), invites proscription. Following the lead of the Pabst brief,
language was used which makes it possible to define the geographically relevant market along the lines of barriers to entry
and product differentiation.'3 2 Both in substance and effect the
guideline standards are, as were the briefs, closely keyed to the
131.

U.S. Dep't of Justice, Merger Guidelines, in ANTITRUST DEVELOP-

MENTS 1955-1968 (A Supplement to THE REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COI

(May 30, 1968).

132. Id. at 313.
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assumptions of oligopoly theory.183

The crucial question which remains is: How much of the
Government's perspective has been absorbed by the Supreme
Court?
V. THE CASES
The Brown Shoe opinion contains two views of the factseffects-rules equation. The first view appears in Chief Justice
Warren's endeavor to trace the legislative purpose behind the
passage of the amended version of Clayton 7. The second view
emanates from the specific issue confronting the Court-the legality of a horizontal and vertical merger.
The design of the statute was clearly to inject an "incipiency"
standard into merger analysis. Altho)ugh discounting any intent
to incorporate a specific test, quantitative or qualitative, by
which "incipiency" could be related. to anticompetitive effects,
Warren nevertheless felt that the statute evidenced a congressional intent that a discernible nexus between facts, effects, and
sanction should be proved. The amendment was designed to
prevent "all mergers having demonstrable anticompetitive effects."1 34 The "primary index of market power"' 35 comes from
the statistics of market share control. Significantly, the Court
read Congress' intent as refusing to tie the judiciary down to
broad abstracted standards that would have universal and mechanical application. Instead, Congress intended that each merger be "functionally viewed, in the context of its particular industry."'3 6 Moreover, the Court fell; that the present existence
of concentration, recent trends toward domination by a few, foreclosure, and barriers to entry, were relevant factors. The significance of each factor would vary "in importance with the merger
under consideration. .... ,,137
In recommending an "incipiency" or "probability" interpre133. A concentrated market structure, where a few firms account for a large share of the sales, tends to discourage vigorous
price competition ... and to encourage other kinds of conduct
-. of an economically undesirable nature.
ATT'Y G.
NAT'L Commw. ANTITRUST RE. 312 (1955).
134. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
135. Id. at 322, n.38. Warren qualified this position by adding: "but
only a further examination of the particular market-its structure, history and probable future-can provide the appropriate setting for judging the probable effect of the merger." Id.
136. Id. at 321-22.
137. Id. at 322.
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tation of section 7, Congress meant to lower the plaintiff's burden of proof from the high and unrealistic standards imposed
by the Sherman Act.138 The extent to which the burden was to
be lessened was left to judicial interpretation. In analyzing the
vertical merger between Brown and Kinney, the Court struck a
position that leaned towards the Sherman Act requirements of
proof. The primary standard utilized by Warren in Brown Shoe
to gauge the evidence came from pre-amendment merger cases
in combination with Clayton 3 cases. 139 Although the importance of market foreclosure was minimized,140 the Court did in
fact relate much of the factual evidence to this standard. Analogies to tying arrangements, exclusive dealing and requirements contracts, were invoked to set up a level of proscriptive
foreclosure. Anticompetitive "economic purpose" motivationlong held relevant in antitrust cases-was considered crucial in
foreclosure analysis. That Brown was the fourth largest manufacturer of shoes, while Kinney was the nation's largest operator of independent retail outlets, prompted the conclusion that
"in this industry, no merger between a manufacturer and an
independent retailer could involve a larger potential market fore4

closure."' '
Oligopoly was very much a part of Warren's analysis. He
was not, however, concerned with the theoretical implications or
mechanical assumptions which accompany the term; to him oligopoly connoted nothing more than an undesirable level of
concentration. While the Sherman Act was monopoly-oriented,
the new Clayton 7 was directed toward a classification of concentration known as oligopoly. The amendment had, in other
142
words, focused its attention on the more prevalent condition.
This meant that notions of the predictability of competitive
effects had to be geared to a new standard. Thus, in a horizontal
138. D.

MARTIN, supra note 89, at 240-53.
139. Warren analogized the proscriptive standard of Clayton 3 with
the amended Section 7.
Congress not only indicated that "the tests of illegality [under
§ 7] are intended to be similar to those which the courts have
applied in interpreting the same language as used in other

sections of the Clayton Act," but also chose for § 7 language
virtually identical to that of § 3 of the Clayton Act... which
had been interpreted by this Court to require an examination
of the interdependence of the market share foreclosed by,
and the economic purpose of, the vertical arrangement.

370 U.S. at 329.

140.
141.
142.
control

Id.
Id. at 331-32.
At one point oligopoly was recognized as a danger to "local
of industry and upon small business." Id. at 333.
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merger where the market is atomistic and it is oligopoly that is
sought to be prevented, the level of market share control that
invites proscription is lower than under the Sherman Act.
The move to a lower market share proscriptive standard
was confirmed one year later in United States v. Philadelphia
National Bank.143 The Court adopted a shorthand test of presumptive illegality in horizontal mergers that was predicated on
the creation of a firm "controlling an undue percentage share of
the relevant market ...

[which] results in a significant increase

in the concentration of firms in that market .... "144 The test
was ostensibly framed along the lines of discernible market share
absorption and foreclosure; strong vibrations of economic theory
were perceptible, however. 45
The Court adopted a new mode of precedent interpretation
with regard to market foreclosure. Percentage figures of foreclosure were quoted, but for the first time they were related to
the stucture of the particular market. In each case the market
structure could be classified as oligopolistic: In Standard Oil
Company v. United States, 46 six firms accounted for 65 per cent
of the market; in Federal Trade Commission v. Motion Picture
Advertising Service Company 47 four firms foreclosed 75 per cent
of the market. In addition, an emerging effort to accommodate
legal conclusions with economics is apparent. The Court noted
that the presumptive rule was "fuly consonant with economic
48
theory."'
A presumptive rule assumes adverse competitive effects.
Although the Court did not indicate the degree of influence that
economic theory exerted, nor expressly posit theoretical effects,
it did set in motion the move to the a priori mechanism.
Two years subsequent to Brown Shoe, in United States v.
Aluminum Company of America149 the theoretical consequences
of oligopoly were, in a casual manner, posited. A merger that
added only 1.3 per cent of the relevant product market to the ac143. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
144. Id. at 363.
145. Brodley says that in Philadelphia Bank, "'Modern economic
theory was brought directly into judicial policy-making, not gradually
but almost suddenly and with decisive results." Brodley, Oligopoly
Power Under the Sherman and Claytor Acts-from Economic Theory
to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285, 301 (1967).
146.

337 U.S. 293 (1949).

147. 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
148.

(1963).
149.

United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363
377 U.S. 271 (1964).
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quiring firm's share was condemned because of, among other
things, the theoretical effects of oligopoly. Justice Douglas reasoned that as oligopoly develops, the likelihood increases that
parallel policies of mutual advantage rather than competition
will emerge. 150 That same year the doctrine of potential competition was welded to oligopoly theory. In laying down criteria
for joint venture analysis in Penn-Olin, 151 the Court followed
closely the approach taken by the Government's brief. It pointed
out that potential competition, in light of the pro-competitive
pressures that are implicit in the doctrine (here the Court used a
quote from the Government's brief) ,152 is an influence that should
be preserved when the market is oligopolistic. Potential competition is a neutralizing agent, or more specifically, a device
through which workable competition can be attained. Stated
differently, the assumptions of one theory-potential competition-are used to combat the a priori anticompetitive effects of
another theory-oligopoly. 153
54
In Consolidated Foods,1
Von's Grocery,155 and Pabst,156 reliance on economic theory by the Court is barely, if at all, discernible. Despite the fact that each of the decisions was decided
against the defendants, none of them can be said to be directly
responsive to the arguments raised by the Government. At the
same time, none of the cases reflects a repudiation of economic
theory.
In the ConsolidatedFoods brief, the Government contended
that where proof of anticompetitive conduct-accommodative reciprocity-is difficult, the plaintiff can meet the burden by
demonstrating the existence of a structural environment that
150. Id. at 280.
151. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964). In
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964), decided
several months prior to the Penn-Olin case, the Court struck down a
merger between El Paso and Pacific Northwest on the grounds that the
acquisition eliminated Pacific Northwest as a potential competitor. There
was, however, much in the record to indicate that Pacific was more an
actual, than potential, competitor.
152. 378 U.S. at 174; see Brief for Appellant at 47, United States v.
Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
153. The existence of an agressive, well equipped and well
financed corporation engaged in the same or related lines of
commerce waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market
would be a substantial incentive to competition which cannot
be underestimated.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964).
154. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
155. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
156. 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
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might tempt firms to engage in such practices. 157 Justice Douglas, never reaching this point, instead stressed the demonstrable
and coercive manifestations of reciprocity pressures. His treatment was primarily conduct and effect oriented. He considered
the consequences of reciprocity anticompetitive because the practice furnishes the acquired company with "a protected market,
which others cannot penetrate despite superiority of price, quality, or service . ... ,158 On the other hand, environmentalism
was not totally ignored. Conduct was viewed in terms of its
effect on the structure of the industry in which the acquired
firm participated. The Court stated that "[i]f it is desirable to
prevent a trend toward oligopoly it is a fortiori desirable to
remove . .. obstacles to the creation of genuinely competitive
conditions in an oligopolistic industry."' 159
Not even tinges of economic theory, structural or otherwise,
appeared in Pabst or Von's Grocery. Pabst is notable for its apparent relegation of proof of the relevant geographical market to
inconsequential status. The Government argued that a barrier-toentry formula is the most appropriate method of establishing an
area of effective competition. It was, as has been pointed out, a
formula that imposed upon the plaintiff a burden of proof that
could hardly be characterized as heavy. Justice Black, who authored both Pabst and Von's Grocery, seemingly removed any
relevant geographical market burden whatsoever from the plaintiff, stating that
[p]roof of the section of the country where the anticompetitive
effect exists is entirely subsidiary to the crucial question in...
every § 7 case which is whether a merger may substantially lessen competition anywhere in the United States. 100
In his treatment of the merits of the case, Black avoided the
problems of competitive effect analysis. Neither theory nor effort at effect ascertainment was employed to bridge the gap between facts and antitrust decisional principles. Primary statistical facts, reflecting a trend toward concentration, were extended into a proscriptive holding.
Again in the Von's Grocery case, Black glossed over theory
and competitive effect analysis. Perhaps the Court felt that
neither method would have been satisfactory in light of the
record. At best the market was not even a loose oligopoly. At
157. See note 112 supra,and accompanying text.
158. FTC v. Consolidated Food Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 599 (1965).
The Court adopted the conclusion of the FTC.
159. Id. at 597, again adopting the Commission's conclusions.
160. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549-50 (1966).
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the time of their merger, there were 3,818 single-store grocery
firms operating in Los Angeles. Competition was vigorous,
with frequent entry and exits. Perhaps, as one commentator
suggests, the factual description of the market environment
might have been too inadequate for anything but superficial
analysis.10 ' Whatever the reason, the fact remains that Justice
Black based his decision on two rather nebulous grounds. The
first basis was the existence of a trend away from a proprietorship-dominated market to a market composed of chain storesthe "Mom and Pop Store" argument. The second ground was the
joining of "two highly successful, expanding and aggressive competitors that created the second largest grocery chain in Los

Angeles .... -12
Whether the reasoning of Pabst and Von's Grocery is explained in terms of "populism,"' 163 as over-simplification, or as
the work product of a result-oriented court, these decisions represent little more than a hiatus of short duration in the Supreme
Court's increasing commitment to economic theory. Justice
Douglas, who had somewhat off-handedly introduced the oligopoly theoretical mechanism in United States v. Aluminum
Company of America,164 forcefully thrusts a broad scheme of
theories back into Supreme Court cognition in Federal Trade
Commission v. Procter & Gamble Company.6 5 In the Clayton 7
action, Douglas invoked at least three a priori approaches66
oligopoly, potential competition, and barriers to entry.
At the time of the merger, 1957, both Procter & Gamblethe acquiring firm-and Clorox-the acquired company-occupied positions of dominance in their respective industries. Procter functioned on a diversified basis, with one-half of its sales
coming from soaps, detergents, and cleansers. In packaged detergents Procter controlled 54.4 per cent of the market. Eighty
per cent of the market was controlled by a combination of three
manufacturers-Colgate-Palmolive, Lever Brothers, and Procter.
Because Procter dealt in quick turnover consumer goods, it
advertised heavily; in 1957 it was the nation's largest advertiser.
Clorox produced only liquid bleach. In the household bleach
industry six firms accounted for 80 per cent of sales; Clorox led
161. Brodley, supra note 145, at 308.
162. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272 (1966).
163. Brodley, supra note 145, at 308.
164. 377 U.S. 271 (1964); see note 150 supra, and accompanying text.
165. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
166. Actually four theories were invoked if product differentiation
is separated from barriers to entry.
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with 48.8 per cent. After the top six firms, the market was occupied by over 200 small regional manufacturers.
The use of oligopoly theory made it possible for the Court
to move simultaneously in three closely related directions. First,
by invoking oligopoly doctrine, a favorable background was
created against which additional theoretical conclusions could
be introduced. Potential competition, barriers to entry and product differentiation are, in application, accessories of oligopoly
theory. Secondly, theory was utilized to adduce facts, and,
thirdly, theory was used to abstract and describe anticompetitive
effects.
From a classification assumption that the liquid bleach industry was oligopolistic (which the record supported), an additional fact was assumed via the a :priori route: "price competition was certainly not as vigorous as it would have been if the
industry were competitive."'167 An a priori description of competitive effect which is basic to oligopoly theory-that firms always resort to non-price competition such as product differentiation-is cloaked in this statement. The inter-firm anticipatory
gamesmanship and price leadership elements of oligopoly were
not overlooked. The Court stated that
[t]here is every reason to assume that the smaller firms would
become more cautious in competing due to their fear of retaliation by Procter. It is probable that Procter would become
the
168
price leader and that oligopoly would become more rigid.
In its brief the Government devoted considerable effort toward building a "barrier to entry" argument. With some precision the efficacy of product differentiation precipitated by
advertising and the resultant a priori effects on condition of
entry were hypothesized. 16 9 Douglas embraced product differentiation, but with considerably less analysis and with no effort
to relate the assumed barriers to entry to adverse competitive
effects. Noting the size of Procter's advertising budget, the
importance of advertising to a product that is chemically indistinguishable from those of rivals, and citing an example of
Clorox's success in a regional advertising battle, Douglas capsuled barrier-to-entry effects into a few terse and cloudy words.
He stated that ". . . a new entrant would be much more reluctant
to face the giant Procter than it would have been to face the
167. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967). The
Court cited nothing from the record in support of this.
168. Id.
169. Brief of FTC at 38-48, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S.
568 (1967).
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smaller Clorox."' 7 0
Potential competition was handled in the same pre-emptory
fashion as oligopoly and condition of entry. Assuming the sensitivity of the oligopolist to internal and external competitive
pressures, the maintenance of a force capable of operating as a
governor on pricing became crucial. Procter, prior to the merger, supplied this pressure. However, while the Court concluded
"that the existence of Procter at the edge of the industry exerted
considerable influence on the market,"u 71 it failed to explain
how this influence would have been manifested, particularly as
it related to probable adverse competitive effects.
In summary, Brown Shoe, which advocated functional analytics and a particularistic case-by-case application of Clayton 7,
and which viewed oligopoly as nothing more than a structural
culmination to be considered along with the "history and probable future" of the particular industry under scrutiny, is no
longer authority. It has been stated that "[t] oday, these Brown
Shoe dicta are little more than quaint relics, about as pertinent
to the law of Section 7 as the Palsgrafcase."'172
Following dictum from United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 73 the Court has adopted a mechanical abstractive
methodology in antitrust problem solving. Whether Procter &
Gamble represents a permanent mood remains to be seen. Certainly the opinion reflects the type of analysis that emanates
from the briefs prepared by the Government.
The move to abstractionism has produced a corollary-a
dearth of explanation and analysis. The abruptness and terseness of the Pabstand Von's Grocery opinions furnish meager substance for the development of meaningful ground rules. The
vacuum left by the Procter & Gamble decision is even more serious. The skeletal manner in which the economic theories were
170. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967).

complained that:

Harlan

Economic theory would certainly indicate that a heightening of
such barriers has taken place. But the Court does not explain
why it considers this change to have significance under § 7,
nor does it indicate when or how entry barriers affect competition in a relevant market.
Id. at 584-85 (concurring opinion).
171. Id. at 581.
172. Adler, Merger Rules and Supreme Court Economics, 36 A.B.A.

L.J. 4 (1967).
173. "[I]n any case in which it is possible, without doing violence
to the congressional objective embodied in § 7, to simplify the test
ANTIRMUST

of illegality, the courts ought to do so. ...

phia Nat1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963).

."

United States v. Philadel-
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presented and the off-hand manner in which they were applied
was made manifest by the failure to touch on important questions
of fact and effect. What, for example, was the complexion of
pricing in the liquid bleach industry? Were prices rigid-as they
would be under oligopoly theory? Did the 200 "fringe" firms
exert, as a matter of fact, competitive pressures on the market,
or were they, as theory posits, ineffective, fearful of retaliation,
and disciplined to follow the leaders? In terms of evidence, what
was the height of the entry barriers facing Procter and other
similarly situated firms? A determination of whether prices
were at a profit-maximizing level would have revealed much
about the conditions of entry and about the attractiveness of the
industry to potential competitors. Evidence supporting the conclusion that the efficacy of advertising-inspired product differentiation is dependent solely upon the size of the budget would have
been helpful.
Instead of answering these questions, Douglas followed the
a priori route. The usual mechanical assumptions of oligopoly
theory-price leadership, a lack of price competition, and a disciplined non-competitive industry-were equationalized, along
with product differentiation and potential competition, into the
inevitable decision for the Government.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The dominant feature of the Procter & Gamble type of
decisional methodology is that tiough the economy of the
theoretical mechanism, facts, competitive effects and rules are
combined under the shelter of an abstract norm. Oligopoly
theory encompasses conclusions as to both effects and standards
of violation. By classifying markets as oligopolistic-either as
presently existing or as a potential result of the practices being
scrutinized-assumptions as to adverse competitive consequences
automatically follow. The oligopolistic classification also sets a
proscriptive norm-in a sense the term oligopoly, with its concomitant theoretical assumptions, is a shorthand description for a
structural per se rule. The doctrines of potential competition,
barriers to entry and product differentiation evoke the same presumption.
A.

ADViNTAGES

There are advantages attendant to the a priori mechanical
technique. The obvious advantage, and the one upon which much
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of this article has focused, is that present anticompetitive effects,

or their imminent appearance, are conclusively assumed. The
complex problem of convincingly relating concrete factual events
of the past and present to the future is therefore avoided. The
decisions demand only a sparse factual foundation to support
the use of theory. Thus, there is a light burden on the plaintiff
to produce, and on the court to analyze, relevant facts. Both of
these factors are particularly attractive to courts confronted with
situations such as reciprocal trading and conglomerate mergers,
where traditional factual predictors of competitive impact are
of little value.
The conclusion that the theoretical mechanism possesses
strains of per se proscription is inescapable. By making minimal
factual soundings and enveloping these efforts in a priori conclusions, as Douglas did in Procter & Gamble, the Court

approaches per se reasoning. This is undoubtedly what Harlan
had in mind when he complained that the majority in Procter
& Gamble had applied "a kind of res ipsa loquitur approach.
)$174

B. PROBLEMS
The theoretical mechanism generates serious problems. At
the expense of being tautological, theory is, after all, theory.
To maintain symmetry, the creator of the a priori model frequently "selects for main emphasis certain features which its
analytical tools can handle, thus introducing a selective bias
into its standard of judgment."' 75 This is perhaps fine for the
economist, who is accountable only to his craft and to the criticisms of his colleagues. It is not, however, compatible with a
legal system which must make judgments that have concrete
ramifications affecting the actual operations of the litigants and
the market in which they participate. Antitrust decisions
should incorporate, so far as practicable, points of reference
which have validity in reality. It was just this point that
prompted Mr. Justice Harlan to raise the following query:
At the outset, it seems to me that there is a serious question whether the state of our economic knowledge is sufficiently advanced to enable a sure-footed administrative or
judicial determination to -be -made a priori of substantial anticompetitive effect in mergers of this kind. It is clear enough
that Congress desired that conglomerate and product-exten174. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 582 (1967)
curring opinion).
175.

J. CLAM,

CoMETITIONr

AS A DYxAmIC PRocEss 61 (1961).

(con-
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sion mergers be brought under § 7 scrutiny, but well versed
economists have argued that
such scrutiny can never lead to a
76
valid finding of illegality.

The fact that sharp differences of opinion exist among economists themselves as to the "best" theory or as to the weight to
be given specific elements in a theory lends credence to Harlan's
comment. Indeed the Court's a priori shorthand methodology
prompted one member of the antitrust bar to complain that the
Supreme Court is actually misreading economic theory. Protesting exclusive reliance by the Court on the percentage figures
of increased concentration-specifically in the Alcoa, Von's
Grocery, and Pabst decisions-he said: "The economics literature, including works cited by the Court itself, makes clear that
recent merger decisions do not rest on accepted economic
theory."'1'
Another problem created by the theoretical mechanism is
the imposition of a heavier and unfamiliar burden on the defendant. A defense constructed along traditional lines't 8-- disputing facts, arguing against conclusions as to probable competitive effects, and sifting through case precedent-is simply
not responsive to the a priori style. Whatever course of argumentation he follows, the defendant will have to get into the
elusive and esoteric field of economic theory. He can argue
against the validity of the theory-questioning either its empirical foundation or its relevance to the case at hand-and
urge the court to return to the facts-effects-rules equation.
Another possibility for the defendant is to contend that the
Government's underlying theory is inappropriate and suggest a
replacement. Oligopoly theory could, for example, be countered
by Shumpeter's "creative destruction" concept. But, by responding in this fashion the defendant has committed himself to
a battle of theories. Since such theories as oligopoly, barriers to
entry, and product differentiation totally dominate the present
scene, the defendant's chance of convincing a court to accept a
different theory is extremely remote. 79
176. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 587 (1967)
curring opinion).

(con-

177. Adler, supra note 172, at 6.
178. See Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74 HARV. L. Rsv. 226, 253-56 (1960).
179. There is a final problem of greater subtlety. The close analogy between theoretical mechanism and per se proscription raises the
complaint of a lack of procedural due process. See Oppenheim, Federal
Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy,
50 MiCH. L. Ru-. 1139 (1952).
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All of the preceding difficulties complicate the ultimate
question of whether the theoretical mechanism is compatible
with a legal system committed to a decisional ideal of "regularity, reckonability and justice."' 8 0 The Court's reliance on a
priori reasoning makes it unlikely that the business community

will be able to extract from the opinions decipherable guidelines
around which future conduct can be oriented. The circumstances

under which such assumptions as oligopoly and barrier to entry
drop down to proscribe specific types of business conduct remains shrouded in the rarified atmosphere of theoretical antitrust jurisprudence.

C. ALTERNATIVE METHODOLOGIES
How far must we search for economic truth in a particular
case when the economic facts may be obscure at best, when the
relevant economic theories may be controversial or indefinite,
and when the statute does not give us a clear- cut value
choice? 181
The problems connected with the collection and analysis of
facts sufficient to serve as a base for decisions as to the probable competitive consequences of an acquisition are so complex
that there is strong temptation to look for simple tests. Simple
formulae are, 8 however,
untrustworthy indices of competitive
2
consequences.
Legal requirements are prescribed by legislatures and
courts, not by economic science.' 8 3
Given the intricacies of accurately profiling, the connection
between the commercial facts of a dynamic marketplace and
probable competitive effects, the indeterminate statutory guidelines set down by Congress, and the Supreme Court's employment of theoretical mechanism with its attendant inadequacies,
the question logically turns to the availability and feasibility of
alternative decisional methods. There are three additional methods of handling the problem-theory as a point of departure,
the functional and particularistic method, and hierarchical guidelines.

1. Theory as a Point of Departure
Theory can be employed as a point of reference for localizing
the problem areas and for guiding factual inquiry. If the factual
180. X. LLEWELLYN, THE Co1mmoN LAW TRADITION 183 (1960).
181. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYsIs: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASEs 5
(1967).
182. FTC, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcQuisTioNs 174
(1955).
183. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Coivnm. ANTITRUST REP. 316 (1955).
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evidence tends-in terms of "a reasonable probability"-to support the foundational hypothesis. proscription would follow.
For example, the theory of oligopoly posits specific actions and
reactions among rivals that are considered detrimental to competition. The court would then examine the record to determine
if the activity under scrutiny would lead to the structure that
gives rise to the a priori assumptions, and whether the facts
indicate that the firms have conducted, or are likely to conduct,
business as the theory hypothesizes. Or, if the barriers-to-entry
doctrine were applied, effort would be made to ascertain whether
the facts indicated that barriers would, or did, exist and that
the conduct under investigation was a prime contributor.
Economic theories would establish antitrust norms. There
would be a known and consistent framework of argumentation
within which litigants would be expected to operate. Certain
prespecified economic facts would be relevant in a given controversy. Conversely, those facts outside the perimeter of the controlling theory could be ignored. Substantiation-the nexus between facts and a priori judgments-would not have to be conclusive; a reasonable probability would be sufficient.
The departure methodology presupposes more than a casual
familiarity with the subtleties of pure theory. The court would
thus be burdened with learning the esoterica of economic theory.
This could prove burdensome; it takes more than a novice to
determine if the theory to be applied actually coincides with the
problem at hand. Another potential difficulty is that the determination of which facts fall within the ambit of inquiry would
be heavily influenced by that group with the greatest expertise
in economic fact sifting-the economist-rather than counsel.
2. FunctionalParticularisr
In many respects functional particularism has rule-of-reason
overtones. This methodology is essentially the Brown Shoe type
of functional, factor by factor, case by case, analysis. 184 The
options open to the court are obviously wide, all pertinent areas
of inquiry-conduct, structure, performance, "Mom and Popism"--are subject to analysis. Presumably the opportunity for
effect analysis, either in terms of probabilities or actualities,
would be great. On the other hand, it is equally likely that the
wide choice in direction and the absence of indicators could bog
down the court with irrelevancies.
184. See notes 134-41 supra,and accompanying text.
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It was specifically this form of open-end decisional meth-

odology that spawned the theoretical mechanism.

The in-

definiteness of functional particularism as a consistent guide to

proscription and the opportunity that it provides for a myriad
of defensive postures has made it unattractive to enforcement

agencies and courts-sufficiently unattractive to prompt a search
for simplified, and mechanical, tests of illegality.
3.

Hierarchical Guidelines

The final alternative assumes the existence of an economic
court, composed of specialists, who would implement published
proscriptive guidelines. These guidelines could be either in statutory form or promulgated through a method similar to that
presently followed by the FTC and the Justice Department. 8 5
The Supreme Court would be relieved of the heavy burden of
dealing with the Gestalt of antitrust. The assumption is that
by placing the decision-making responsibility in the hands of
experts, greater consistency and analysis in opinions could be
achieved. 86
Another advantage of this method is that areas of competing
interests and objectives-performance versus behavior, behavior
versus structure, economies versus concentration-would be resolved into hierarchical levels, with the results being incorporated into the guidelines. In the majority of cases application of
the guidelines would be automatic. Moreover, the lack of predictability and the inability to anticipate proscription-of which
the businessman so bitterly complains-would be reduced. At
the same time the unique situation which inevitably occurs could
be covered by appropriately worded caveats.
Perhaps the chief feature of the hierarchical guideline
approach is that it does not focus on competitive effect analysis.
This problem is by-passed by the development of predetermined
criteria of evaluation which either assume adverse effects or
18 7
deem their existence irrelevant.
However, the architectural problems of reducing the guidelines to actual practice are indeed formidable. There is the
185. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 131.
186. Elman, The Need for Certainty and Predictability in the Applicationof the Merger Law, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 613 (1965).
187. See, e.g., C. KAYsEN & D. TuEm, ANTITRUST PoLicY: AN EcoNOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 98 (1965).
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practical problem of convincing Congress that an economic court
is desirable. If statutory guidelines are utilized, a drafting problem appears. The legislative process is not the ideal environment for the intricacies of economic objectives to be organized
into a neatly structured proscriptive hierarchy. The conflicting
views of economists, the efforts of pressure groups, and the
compromise modus operandi of legislative enactment, would all
serve to distort the final product. It is also apparent that by
enacting broadly-worded statutes, and leaving the task of filling
in to the courts and the FTC, Congress has already indicated a
disinclination to come to grips with the specifics of antitrust.
There is justification for Congress's attitude. If the guidelines
are too specific in relating to the contemporary commercial scene
and to the economic dogma of the day, they contain a built-in
impermanence and inflexibility factor.
Non-statutory guidelines present the opposite problem.
They are subject to instant change without prior notice. Other
than as indicators of decisional intent they would have no binding force. 8 8
D.

RECOMMENDED

METHODOLOGY

The relevance of economics to antitrust cannot be seriously
disputed. The substantive vocabulary of modern antitrust traces
its origin to economics. The measuring techniques of the economist and the sense of direction provided by his pertinent questions have made possible a sophisticated level of insight into
problem areas heretofore unattainable. The problem is clearly
not that the two fields possess no mutual relevance or that no
affinity of doctrine exists. Quite the reverse, the problem
is that the Supreme Court has undiscerningly over-absorbed
economics. The consequence of wholesale and indiscriminate
absorption has been the failure to individualize and tailor theory
to the given fact situation. The superficiality of the Procter &
Gamble decision forcefully illuminates the inappropriateness of
the theoretical mechanism as a decisional tool.
The best means of neutralizing the theoretical mechanism
and at the same time bringing the patterns of antitrust decision
making closer to traditional standards of predictability, is
through the Theory as a Point of Departure methodology.
Two reasons prompt this judgment. First, the other alternative
188. For an enthusiastic view of the non-statutory rule-making process, see Elman, Rulemaking Procedures in' the FTC's Enforcement of the
Merger Law, 78 HAav. L. Rzv. 385 (1964).
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methodologies, FunctionalParticularismand HierarchicalGuidelines, pose serious problems of implementation.
The first
method is too vague and loose; the second method, assuming
legislative acceptance, would be too inflexible in application.
Secondly, it is assumed that the theoretical models discussed in
this article establish a reasonable and valid perimeter for inquiry into the applicability of antitrust statutes: A "reasonable"
perimeter in the sense that the examination can be accomplished
through the traditional evidential framework of the courtroom;
a "valid" perimeter in that the models are predicated upon
assumptions that have general credence and acceptability
among economists and lawyers.:1 9
The Point of Departure method pulls antitrust interpretation back to a "reasonable probability" perspective. Facts, after
a sifting dictated by the imperatives of the applicable theory,
are channeled towards predetermined niches. The emphasis is
on proving a reasonable-or probable-connection between facts
and a priori competitive effects. The adoption of a facts-effects
equation keyed to clearly identified economic theory would hopefully inspire "regularity, reckonability, and justice." An important by-product would be deeper analysis and explanation.
The candid use of economic theory calls for an appreciation
and familiarity of economics that the Supreme Court has thus
far not as a group exhibited. 190 It is this point that constitutes
the major obstacle to the Point of Departure method. It is not,
however, an insurmountable barrier. There are two possible
ways to eliminate this difficulty. Economists could be employed as law clerks for individual justices either on a permanent
basis or on a "big case" basis. There is precedent for this in
Judge Wyzanski's use of Professor Carl Kaysen in the United
191
States v. United Shoe Corporation
trial litigation. The other
189. See notes 53-59 supra, and accompanying text.
BAiN, BARRIERS TO NEW CO1MPETITION (1965);

R.

See also J.

CAVES, AMEaRIcAN INDUSTRY: STUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE (rev. ed. 1967); W. FELLNER,
ComPETnTrON AMONG THE FEW (1960); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra
note 188; M. LINDAHn & W. CARTER, CORPORATE CONCENTRATION AND PUBLIC

POLICY (1959); Brodley, supra note 145.
190. One outstanding exception is Mr. Justice Harlan. His concurring remarks in the Procter & Gamble case are reflective of his sensitivity to the delicate balance between law and economics.
191. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954). For a summary of his findings see C. KAYsEN, UNTED STATES
V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORP.

(1956).

The economist-law clerk

idea has been criticized by Massel: "It provides neither adversary with
an opportunity to present evidence and arguments to counter the advice
which is given to the judge in private." Massel adds that
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possibility is the creation of a permanent economic advisory
committee which would be responsible for the entire Court. The
advantage of the latter arrangement is that by being responsive
to the entire Court, dialogue among the justices would be encouraged. 1 92 On the other hand, the intimacy that would prevail under the first plan would be more likely to kindle a greater
193
degree of expertise in the individual justices.
The above recommendations should not be construed as a
proposal that the courts in genera]. and the Supreme Court in
particular abdicate or delegate decision-making responsibilities.194 It is a recognition that on a defined and controlled
basis, economic theory is a necessary instrument to enlightened
antitrust enforcement. It is also a recognition that the theoretical mechanism is not in the best interests of a legal system
which prides itself on maintaining rapport with the worthwhile
social and economic vibrations of the community.

if each side knows that a judge will hear such ex parte ad-

vice, lawyers will feel compelled to present every facet of a
market situation instead of covering only as much as they feel
is needed to counter the presentation of their opponents.
M. MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY 173 (Anchor ed. 1964).
Restricted to the trial court level this may be a valid criticism. The Attorney General's report agreed, stating that the "place of an economic
expert in antitrust trials is no higher than an expert in any field, namely,

as a witness on the stand

...

"

ATT'Y

GEN.

NAT'L COMM. ANTITRUST

REP. 366 (1955). At the appellate level, where the issues have already
been defined, it is not valid.
192. One gets the unhappy feeling that there is no dialogue in
the Court between the majority and minority. Although the fact
must be otherwise, it almost seems that a dissent is not even read
by the author of the prevailing opinion.
Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review-1967, 53 VA. L. REV.
1667, 1698 (1967).
193. The overall resources of the Supreme Court are non-existent
when compared with those available to the legislature and executive
branches. See Lewis, The High Court: Final... But Fallible, 19 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 528 (1968).
194. The advice of Roscoe Pound on this point is relevant:
[Courts] cannot delegate their task of decision according to law
either to legal or to non-legal experts. Economists can help
in the process of application of law by giving us a more assured
grasp of the goals to be attained and by helping in the choice of
starting points for legal reasoning which must go on in the
interpretation and application of legal precepts. But decision
must be according to law and not according to the economic
theory of the moment ....
Pound, Foreward to C. GRIFFEN, AN EcOxNO mc APPROACH TO ANTITRUST
PROBLEMS at vii (1951).

